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ABSTRACT: The game of life is an excellent framework for metaphysical modelling.  It
can be used to study ontological categories like space, time, causality, persistence,
substance, emergence, and supervenience.   It is often said that there are many levels of
existence in the game of life. Objects like the glider are said to exist on higher levels.
Our goal here is to work out a precise formalization of the thesis that there are various
levels of existence in the game of life.  To formalize this thesis, we develop a set-
theoretic construction of the glider.  The method of this construction generalizes to other
patterns in the game of life.  And it can be extended to more realistic physical systems.
The result is a highly general method for the set-theoretical construction of substances.
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1. Introduction
According to Quine, a Democritean World is a distribution of binary values over the
points of space-time (Quine, 1969: 147-155).  About the same time that Quine was
thinking of Democritean Worlds, the mathematician John Conway was developing the
game of life (Gardner, 1970).  The game of life provides many opportunities for serious
ontological study.  It is simple enough that many ontological problems appear there with
striking clarity.  And it is complex enough that the solutions to these problems have at
least some reasonable chance of scaling up to our universe.  Within the game of life, you
can study problems of space, time, causality, persistence, and substance.
The game of life has also been used to study problems associated with supervenience and
emergence (Bedau, 1997; Beer, 2004; Hovda, 2008).  Closely associated with these
concepts is the thesis is that there are various levels of existence.  Each level has its own
ontology and is described by its own language.  For instance, Bedau (1997) distinguishes
between a micro-level and a macro-level.  Dennett (1991) uses the game of life to
illustrate his distinction between the physical, design, and intentional levels.  The thesis
that there are different levels of existence is especially intriguing.  On the one hand, it
links up with the classical idea of the great chain of being (Lovejoy, 1936).  On the other
hand, it links up with more recent technical work involving mereology and set theory, as
well as recent work in object-oriented programming and the study of software ontologies.
Our goal here is to work out a precise formalization of the thesis that there are various
levels of existence in the game of life.  We will use a single game of life question to
develop this thesis.  The question is: what is a glider?  To answer this question, we
develop a method of set-theoretic construction that is highly general.  As we apply this
method, we will produce a series of constructions.  These constructions are set-theoretic
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substances).  It should be clear that we are only doing metaphysical modelling (see
Meixner, 2010).  This modelling can help us precisely understand the relations among
real ontological categories.
2. The Nature of the Glider
We assume familiarity with the game of life (for an introduction, see Poundstone, 1985).
For our purposes, space is infinite in all directions.  Time is one-way infinite from an
initial state.  Time in the game of life is understood classically (that is, it is absolute).
Every point in space-time has a field value either 0 or 1.  Thus space-time supports a
binary scalar field.  This field evolves according to the causal law of life.
A point is active if its field value is 1.  Activity is analogous to the presence of stuff
(matter) in the game of life.  On this interpretation, the evolution of the activity in the
field is the evolution of its material content.   Figure 1 shows an intriguing distribution of
activity.  When the game of life is animated by running it on a computer and displaying
the states of space on the screen, this distribution appears to move.  The apparent motion
of the distribution is extremely vivid.   The apparent motion is produced by well-known
aspects of the human visual system.
For many people, the apparent motion of the distribution is so powerful that it produces
the strong belief that there really does exist an entity that is moving.  This production
raises the venerable philosophical question about the relation of appearance to reality:
under what conditions do appearances justify the existence of some associated real
entity?  For the distribution in Figure 1, many writers do accept the inference from
appearance to reality: the apparent motion justifies the existence of an entity that is
moving.  This entity is the glider.  Friends of glider-existence say that gliders supervene
on the activities of the points or even that they emerge from those activities.  If gliders do
exist, then they are not space-time points.  Hence they must exist on some higher level of
existence.
We are not interested in either attacking or defending the existence of the glider.  We are
interested in trying to make precise formal sense out of what it means to say that gliders
exist and that there are many levels of existence in the game of life.  Our goal is to
formalize the concept of the glider by giving an exact set-theoretic construction of the
glider.  The techniques used in this construction can be directly applied to other
diachronic regularities in the game of life (e.g. blinkers, spaceships, logic gates, Turing
machines, etc.).  And these techniques can be extended to more realistic physical
systems.
3Figure 1.  The apparent motion of a glider.
3. Formalizing the Nature of the Glider
3.1 Ordinals
Ordinals.  Ordinal numbers were originally defined by von Neumann (1923). The initial
ordinal is denoted 0.  It the empty set {}.  So 0 = {}.  For every ordinal n, the next ordinal
is n+1.  The ordinal n+1 is {0, . . n}.  So 1 = {0} = {{}}.  And 2 = {0, 1} = {{}, {{}}}.
And 3 = {0, 1, 2}.  Figure 2 depicts the membership diagram of the ordinal 3.  A arrow
directed from dot x to dot y in Figure 2 indicates x is a member of y.
Ordinals are ordered in two ways.  First, they are ordered with respect to one another.
The order relation is identical with the membership relation.  For any two ordinals m and
n, m is less than n iff m is a member of n.  Second, every ordinal is internally ordered by
the membership relation.  For any ordinal n, the diagram of its internal membership
relation is also the diagram of the less than relation.  So, an ordinal is a set that is
intrinsically well-ordered by the membership relation.   The less than relation is not
extrinsic to the ordinal.  It is part of the definition of the ordinal.  Hence there is a sense
in which the ordinal encodes that relation.  An ordinal is a set that encodes its essential
nature in its structure.
Figure 2.  The membership diagram of the ordinal 3.
3.2 Space and Time
Space-Time.  Space-time is (Z × Z) × N.  The third coordinate is the timeline.  Time runs
from 0 through all the finite ordinal numbers.  A region is any set of points.  Say region x
is a subregion of region y iff x is a subset of y.
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time points at a single time coordinate.  For each t in N, the moment M(t) is the set of all
points (x, y, t) such that x and y are in Z.   Thus the moment M(t) = (Z × Z) × {t}.
Spatial Regions.  A spatial region is any set of simultaneous points.  The points in a
spatial region all have the same time coordinate; they are all in the same moment.  For
every moment M(t), the set of spatial regions REG(t) is the power set of M(t).
Our first proposed definition for the glider is that it is a spatial region with a certain
shape.  To define this shape, we start with the fact that every glider is centered on a point.
This point is (x, y, t).  We define the shape of the glider around the center.  For any point
(x, y, t), the glider-shaped region around that point is the set {(x, y+1, t), (x+1, y, t), (x-1,
y-1, t), (x, y-1, t), (x+1, y-1, t)}.  Our first proposal says that every glider-shaped region
is a glider.  Of course, this proposal faces an immediate fatal objection: a glider is a
region in which all the points are active.   Beer says “the label ‘glider’ refers to the
distinctive pattern of five ON cells”(2004: 312).  Any definition of the glider must include
this activity.
3.3 Material Content
Qualified Points.  A qualified point has some material content – it is a point along with
the value of the binary scalar field at that point.  More formally, a qualified point is a pair
of the form (point, field-value).  A qualified point is active if its field-value is 1; it is
inactive if its field-value is 0.  Since points are coordinate triples, a qualified point has the
form ((x, y, t), v).  The set of qualified points in the game of life is (Z × Z × N) × {0, 1}.
An active point is a pair of the form (point, field value 1).  An inactive point is a pair of
the form (point, field value 0).
Distributions.  A distribution is an active spatial region.  It is some set of active points at
some instant in time (in the same moment).  For each time t in N, the set of distributions
at t is P(t).  To define P(t), recall that M(t) is the set of all space-time points at the single
time t.   For each moment M(t), the total set of active points over that moment is M(t) ×
{1}.  Now, a distribution is just any set of active points at some moment.   Each subset of
(M(t) × {1}) is a distribution.  So P(t) is the power set of (M(t) × {1}).  The set of
distributions over space-time is P.  P is the union of the P(t) for all t in N.
Our second proposal is that a glider is a distribution with a certain shape.  For any point
(x, y, t), the glider centered on that point is the distribution {((x, y+1, t), 1), ((x+1, y, t),
1), ((x-1, y-1, t), 1), ((x, y-1, t), 1), ((x+1, y-1, t), 1)}.  Unfortunately, this second
proposal fails.  Distributions are static.  However, gliders persist – they are temporally
extended.  As Beer also points out, “a glider is a coherent localized pattern of
spatiotemporal activity in the life universe that continuously reconstitutes itself” (2004:
311).  Any definition of the glider must include the fact that its nature is diachronic.
53.4 Sequences
Sequences.  Since ordinals are intrinsically ordered, we can use them to order other sets.
Given some set S whose size is n, we define a 1-1 correspondence ƒ between the ordinal
n and S.  For example, let S be {A, B, C, D, E}.  The ordinal 5 is the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
It’s easy to associate 5 with S.  One association looks like this: 0  A; 1  B; 2  C; 3
 D; 4  E.  Formally, each arrow is an ordered pair.  Thus 0  A denotes the ordered
pair (0, A).  The association from 5 to S is the function ƒ.  Since the ordinal 5 is ordered,
the function ƒ from 5 to S induces a parallel order on S.  The order is A < B < C < D < E.
A sequence is a 1-1 correspondence from some ordinal to a set.  For our example, the
sequence is the function ƒ = {(0, A), (1, B), (2, C), (3, D), (4, E)}.
Our third proposal is that a glider is a sequence of distributions.  For example, let the
objects A through E be the distributions in Figure 1. The sequence of these distributions
is the function ƒ = {(0, A), (1, B), (2, C), (3, D), (4, E)}.  Accordingly, our third proposal
identifies the glider with that function.   This proposal captures the diachronic nature of
the glider.  However, this diachronic nature is extrinsic to the glider.  It is the result of a
function from something external – an ordinal – onto the distributions.  The stages of the
glider are ordered by their links to ordinals – not to one another.  But the diachronic
nature of the glider is intrinsic.  Any metaphysically adequate definition of the glider
should include this intrinsicness.  We want gliders (or any persistent things) to be more
like ordinals.   Just as the ordinal 3 encodes its own order within its structure, so any
persistent thing should encode its diachronic order within its structure.
3.5 Chains
Chain.  A pair (u, v) is linked to a pair (v, w).  Those two pairs are linked by their
common member v.  A chain is a series of pairs in which every pair but the last is linked
to exactly one next pair.  Chains are either finite or infinite.
Finite Chain.  For any set of pairs X, say X is a finite chain iff there exists some ordinal
n+1 and there exists some function ƒ from n+1 onto X such that ƒ is 1-1 and for every k
in n, the last item in ƒ(k) is identical with the first item in ƒ(k+1).  For example, consider
the set of pairs X = { (A, B), (B, C), (C, D), (D, E)}.  There is a function ƒ that maps the
ordinal 4 onto this X as follows: 0  (A, B), 1  (B, C),  2  (C, D), 3  (D, E).  For k
varying from 0 through 2, the last item of ƒ(k) is the first item of ƒ(k+1).  Thus ƒ(2) is (C,
D) and ƒ(3) is (D, E).  These two pairs are linked at D.
Infinite Chain.  For any set of pairs X, say X is an infinite (or endless) chain iff there
exists some function ƒ from the set of natural numbers N onto X such that ƒ is 1-1 and for
every k in N, the last item in ƒ(k) is identical with the first item in ƒ(k+1).
Chains of Distributions.  A chain of distributions is any set x such that every member of x
is a pair of distributions and x is a chain.  The set of these chains is K.  Note that chains
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no matter where or when the distributions X, Y, and Z appear.
Our fourth proposal is that the glider is a chain of distributions.  Using the distributions
from Figure 1, the glider is the chain {(A, B), (B, C), (C, D), (D, E)}.  Figure 3 is a rough
(not exact) sketch of the membership structure of the chain.  This fourth proposal
captures all our previous reasoning about the nature of the glider.  Given our earlier
definitions, the chain encodes the fact that the glider in Figure 1 has five stages.  Every
stage encodes information about shape and point activity.   The stages are intrinsically
linked within the chain.  But there is a problem.  Although the chain that we gave as an
example has various orders and connectivities, none of those orders or connectivities are
implied by (or encoded in) the proposed definition of the glider as a chain of
distributions.  Such chains need not have any physical orders or connectivities.  For any
type of order or connectivity that gliders do have, we must explicitly build that type into
the definition of the glider.
Figure 3. The glider as a chain of distributions.
3.6 Substances
Substance. A substance is some substratum along with some attributes.  We interpret this
set-theoretically as an ordered tuple in which the substratum comes first.   Thus a
substance is a tuple of the form (s, p1, . . . pn).  The first item s is the substratum.  We
think of any substratum as a set.  The terms p1 through pn are the attributes of the
substratum.
Attributes.  Each attribute is some type of property.  Properties are defined extensionally
as sets of instances.  And to instantiate the property is to be a member of the property.  So
each pi is some set. The fact that the substratum s has the property pi is expressed by
requiring that s is a member of pi.  Hence for any substance, the first item of the tuple is a
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First, if s has some property p, then s is a member of p.  So the attribute of s is p.  Second,
if every member of s has some property p, then s is a member of the power set of p.  So
the attribute is pow p.  And third, if every member of s is in some relation R, then s is a
member of the power set of R.  So the attribute is pow R.
Material Thing.  A material thing is a substance.  Any material thing (in the game of life
or otherwise) has to contain some stuff – it has to have some material content.  Since
distributions contain active points, they provide the material content of a material thing.
They provide the matter.   Although a material thing has to contain some stuff, it does not
have to be formally, spatially, temporally, or causally connected.  But we want to be able
to add these connectivities as we define various types of material things.  Consequently,
the substratum x of a material thing is a set of ordered pairs.  This substratum has exactly
one attribute: every pair in this substratum is a pair of distributions.  This means that the
substratum x is a subset of P × P.  Hence x is a member of pow P × P.  Putting this all
together, a material thing is a tuple (x, pow P × P).
Refinement.  Substances are refined by adding attributes.  When a substance of one type
is refined, the result is a subtype.  The subtype relation determines a genus-species
hierarchy.  The concept of refinement for substances is much like the concept of
refinement in object-oriented programming.  This similarity reveals intriguing
connections between object-oriented programming and set-theoretic construction.  We
will refine material things into concatenations; concatenations into processes; and so on.
Concatenation.  A concatenation is a species of material thing.  It is derived by adding
the attribute of formal connectivity.  Chains are formally connected.  This means that, for
any concatenation, the substratum x is a member of the set of chains K.  Thus a
concatenation has the form (x, pow P × P, K).  Although a concatenation is a chain, this
connectivity is merely formal.  It is neither spatial, nor temporal, nor causal.
Changes.  We can add temporal connectivity by defining changes.  A change is a pair of
distributions in which the first is immediately temporally prior to the second.  For
instance, in the glider in Figure 1, the stage A changes into the stage B.  So (A, B) is a
change.  Recall that P(t) is the set of distributions at time t.  For each time t in N, let T(t)
be the set of all pairs of the form (x, y) where x is in P(t) and y is in P(t+1).  Let T be the
union of the T(t) for all t in N.
Process. A process is a species of concatenation.  It is derived by adding the attribute of
temporal connectivity.  Since processes are concatenations, the pairs in the substratum of
any process already form a formally connected chain.  Thus all we need to do to gain
temporal connectivity is to require each of these pairs to be a change.   For any process,
each pair in the substratum x is a member of the set of changes T.  This means that x is a
subset of T; so x is a member of pow T.  Putting this all together, a process is a tuple (x,
pow P × P, K, pow T).  Processes are formally and temporally connected.
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× P, K, pow T).  For instance, the glider in Figure 1 is defined as this process: ({(A, B),
(B, C), (C, D), (D, E)}, pow P × P, K, pow T).  As a process, the glider has material
content.  The matter is distributed through space and time.  The distribution is formally
and temporally connected.  However, as a process, the distribution of the matter in the
glider is not causally connected.  Nor does it evolve in any regular way.   It is still
necessary to add these two attributes.
3.7 Space-Time Worms
Field Operator.  Each distribution is all the active points in some instantaneous state of a
binary scalar field.  The game of life has a rule that says how this scalar field changes
over time.  This rule is expressible as an operator on the scalar field.  The field operator φ
maps distributions over any moment M(t) to those over the next moment M(t+1).  At any
time t, φ maps every distribution in any P(t) to those in P(t+1).  So φ(t) is the set of all (p,
q) such that p is in P(t) and q is in P(t+1) and the life rule transforms p into q.  The field
operator φ is the union of the φ(t) for all t in N.
Worms.  A space-time worm is a species of process.  It is a process in which the chain of
changes is causally connected.  The attribute of causal connectivity is added by saying
that each pair in x is in the field operator φ.  So x is a subset of φ.  This means x is a
member of the power set of φ.  A worm has the form (x, pow P × P, K, pow T, pow φ).
For the game of life, causal connectivity implies spatial connectivity.
Our sixth proposal is that the glider is a space-time worm.   A glider is any set of the form
(x, pow P × P, K, pow T, pow φ).  For instance, the glider in Figure 1 is the worm ({(A,
B), (B, C), (C, D), (D, E)}, pow P × P, K, pow T, pow φ).  As a worm, the glider has
material content.  The matter is distributed through space and time.  The distribution is
formally, temporally, causally, and spatially connected.  However, as a worm, the
distribution of the material content of the glider does evolve in any regular way.  There is
no program that governs the changes of its shapes.  But the most distinctive attribute of
the glider is that it does evolve in a regular way!  We need to talk about shapes and
programs.
3.8 From Programs to Machines
Shape Equivalence.  The active points in any distribution have some shape.  Two
distributions have the same shape iff there is some coordinate shift that preserves the
positions of their active points.   Formally, distribution x is the same shape as distribution
y iff there is some translation F such that F(x) = y.  The translation shifts coordinates on
either the X or Y axis or both.  Shape equivalence is strictly translational.  It does not
include rotations or reflections.  Rotations and reflections are not allowed because (for
instance) the horizontal and vertical bars of the blinker are regarded as two distinct
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other permutations.  For any distributions x and y, say x ≡ y iff x is the same shape as y.
Shapes.  The shape equivalence relation partitions the set P of distributions into
equivalence classes.  Each equivalence class is a shape.  The set of all shapes is S.
Field Operator on Shapes.  The field operator can be lifted from distributions to shape-
equivalence classes of distributions.  The result is a more abstract field operator Φ that
maps shapes onto shapes.  For any shapes X and Y, the operator Φ maps X onto Y iff for
every distribution x, x is in X iff φ(x) is in Y.
Cycle of Shapes.  A cycle of shapes is a loop in the graph of Φ.  It is a cyclical attractor in
the dynamics of Φ.  Say C is a cycle of shapes iff (1) C is a sequence of shapes 〈C1, C2, . .
. Cn〉; and (2) for every i less than n, Φ maps Ci onto the next shape Ci+1; and (3) Φ maps
the last shape Cn onto the first shape C1.
Cycles in the Game of Life.  The set C*(1) is the set of all shape-cycles of length 1.   Any
cycle of length 1 is an identity cycle.  Any stable shape in the game of life is in an
identity cycle.  For instance, the block in the game of life is a shape in an identity cycle.
Shape-cycles of longer lengths are known as oscillators.  The set C*(n) is the set of all
shape-cycles of length n.  For example, the blinker is an oscillator of cycle length 2.  The
glider is a mobile oscillator of cycle length 4.  The set of all cycles of shapes in the game
of life is C*.  C* is the union of all C*(n) for all n in N.
Cyclical Equivalence.  For any shapes X and Y, X is in the same cycle as Y iff there is
some cycle C such that X is a shape in C and Y is a shape in C.  This is an equivalence
relation on shapes.  Say X is isocyclical with Y iff X is in the same cycle as Y.   Every
cycle is closed under the field operator on shapes.  This closure implies and is implied by
cyclical equivalence.  Closure means that the cycle is a closed attractor basin in the
dynamics of the field operator.
Cyclical Program. A cyclical program M is a pair (C, Φ) where Φ is the field operator on
shapes and C is a cycle of shapes.  The shapes in C are the states in the state-space  of the
program M.  The operator Φ is the transition operator of the program.  Thus any program
can be diagrammed as a state-transition network.
Cyclical Programs in the Game of Life.  For every cycle C in C*, there is exactly one
cyclical program (C, Φ).  The set of all cyclical programs is M*.  It is the set of all pairs
of the form (C, Φ) such that C is a cycle in C*.
Conservation.   Many processes in the game of life exhibit cyclical patterns.   For
instance, blocks (and all still lifes), blinkers (and all oscillators), and gliders (and all
movers) exhibit cyclical dynamics.  Processes with cyclical dynamics display a regularity
that entails a kind of equivalence (their shapes are isocyclical).  This equivalence is an
invariant.  They don’t leave their attractor basin but remain stable within it.  This
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regularity, invariance, or stability is one of the classical marks of thinghood.  It is the
foundation for persistence (and the illusion of an enduring substance).  For any process
that exhibits cyclical dynamics, the regularity is a conserved quality.  It is a cyclical
program.  Given some conserved qualities, we build things.  That is, things are
constructed out of conserved qualities.
Extensions of Programs.  A space-time worm w is an instance of a cyclical program (C,
Φ) iff the initial distribution in the worm is a member of one of the shapes in C.   The
extension of a cyclical program (C, Φ) is the set of all worms that are instances of (C, Φ).
The extension of (C, Φ) is denoted EXT(C, Φ).
Mechanical Things.  A mechanical thing (aka a machine, aka a thing) is a substance.
Since it is temporally connected, it is a process.  Since it is causally connected, it is a
space-time worm.  It is an instance of some cyclical program (C, Φ).  It therefore lies
within the extension of the program.  It is a member of EXT(C, Φ).  We add this attribute
to its bundle.  Thus a mechanical thing is a tuple (x, pow P × P, K, pow T, pow φ, EXT(C,
Φ)).
Our seventh and final proposal is that a glider is a machine.  It is a machine that lies in
the extension of the glider-program.  Let G be the sequence of glider shapes.  Thus a
glider is a tuple (x, pow P × P, K, pow T, pow φ, EXT(G, Φ)).  We think this fully
captures the meaning of Beer’s definition of the glider as “a coherent localized pattern of
spatiotemporal activity in the life universe that continuously reconstitutes itself” (2004:
311).  As a set, the glider exists many, many levels above the micro-level of the life grid
– above the set of qualified space-time points.  If levels of existence are the levels in the
iterative hierarchy of pure sets, then there are many levels above the life grid.  These
levels are populated with objects that are in the game of life ontology.
4. Universes
4.1 Snapshots
Machines like the glider somehow exist in game of life universes.  But what is a game of
life universe?  We formalize such universes as substances.  We might try to treat a
universe as a big machine.   If a universe is a big machine, then the substratum of a
universe is ultimately made of distributions.  But there are two problems.  The first
problem is this: although machines cannot contain empty space, universes can contain
empty space.  Universes can contain inactive points – space-time points whose field
values are 0.  The second problem is this: although no machine can contain every point
on the life grid, every universe must contain every point on the life grid.  To deal with
universes, we first need to build up some preliminary structures that are analogous to
distributions.  These analogous structures can contain empty space and must cover all
points.
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Snapshot.  A snapshot is an instantaneous state of the game of life field.  Snapshots are
analogous to distributions.  However, distributions do not contain any empty space (that
is, they don’t contain any inactive points).  Snapshots contain both active and inactive
points.  And any snapshot spans the entirety of space.  A snapshot is a function from
some moment to {0, 1}.  It associates each point in the moment with either 0 or 1.  For
every time t in N, the set of snapshots at time t is S(t).  S(t) is the set of all ƒ such that ƒ
maps M(t) onto {0, 1}.  The set of all snapshots S is the union of S(t) for all t in N.
Chains of Snapshots.  A chain of snapshots is any set x such that every member of x is a
pair of snapshots and x is a chain.  The set of these chains is Q.  We have a special
interest in endless chains of snapshots.  The set of all endless chains of snapshots is Q*.
Transition.  A transition is a pair of snapshots in which the first is immediately
temporally prior to the second.  For each time t in N, let W(t) be the set of all pairs of the
form (x, y) where x is in S(t) and y is in S(t+1).  Let W be the union of the W(t) for all t
in N.
Field Operator on Snapshots.  Each snapshot is some instantaneous state of a binary
scalar field.  The game of life has a rule that says how this scalar field changes over time.
We already defined a field operator for distributions; we now define it for snapshots.  The
field operator ψ maps snapshots over any moment M(t) to those over the next moment
M(t+1).  At any time t, ψ maps every snapshot in any S(t) to those in S(t+1).  So ψ(t) is
the set of all (p, q) such that p is in S(t) and q is in S(t+1) and the life rule transforms p
into q.  The field operator ψ is the union of the ψ(t) for all t in N.
4.2 From Movies to Universes
Movie.  A movie is a substance.  A movie is analogous to a process.  Just as a process is
defined over distributions, so a movie is defined over snapshots.   Informally, it is a series
of snapshots that is temporally connected and endless.  It need not be spatially or causally
connected.  More formally, the substratum of a movie is a set x of pairs.  The set x has
several attributes.  First, each pair in x is a pair of snapshots.  Hence x is a member of
pow S × S.  Second, a movie is temporally connected.  Since every pair contains
temporally adjacent items, we can obtain temporal connectivity just by asserting that the
pairs form a chain.  We want this chain to be endless – movies go on forever.  Thus x is a
member of Q*.  Third, each pair in x is a transition.  This means that the items in any pair
are temporally adjacent.   Hence x is a subset of W; so x is a member of pow W.  A
movie is therefore a tuple (x, pow S × S, Q*, pow W).  There is a set of all movies over
the life grid.
Universe.  A universe is a substance.  A universe is analogous to a space-time worm.  Just
as a worm is defined over distributions, so a universe is defined over snapshots.  The
substratum of a universe is an endless chain of snapshots.  Informally, a universe is an
endless chain of snapshots that is temporally and causally connected.  Since a movie is an
endless chain of snapshots that is temporally connected, and universes just add causal
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connectivity, a universe is a type of movie.   Thus any universe just adds the attribute of
causal connectivity to any substance whose form is (x, pow S × S, Q*, pow W).  Causal
connectivity is added by saying that each pair in x is in the field operator ψ.  So x is a
subset of ψ.  This means x is a member of the power set of ψ.  Putting this all together, a
universe is a tuple of the form (x, pow S × S, Q*, pow W, pow ψ).
Habitation.  A substance s inhabits a universe U iff every active point in s is an active
point in U.  Every universe contains a maximal substance.  Specifically, it contains a
maximal space-time worm.  All other worms are spatio-temporal parts of that worm.
Some of the subworms of the maximal worm are machines.  Thus for every universe, we
can define the set of worms in that universe and the set of machines in that universe.
5. Further Work
According to Dennett (1991), there are three main levels of existence in the game of life.
These are the physical level; the design level; and the intentional level.  The design level
falls apart into a hierarchy of sublevels.  These sublevels are ranked by complexity.  The
glider is on the lowest sublevel (along with blinkers, eaters, and so on).  Objects on lower
design sublevels can be put together to make more complex objects on higher design
sublevels.  Higher design levels contain things like glider guns, puffer trains, and so on.
And they contain logic gates (Rennard, 2001).  The highest design level contains
universal Turing machines (Rendell, 2001). And, beyond the design levels, Dennett says
there is an intentional level.  It would be nice to study these higher levels.
Further work can also take us beyond the game of life.  Within the game of life, the glider
is an example of a particle-like wave (Adamatzky, 1998).  It is like a soliton.  Solitons
have been used to model particles in our universe – such as quarks interacting within a
proton (Chen, 2006; Dauxois & Peyrard, 2006).  So there is a path – presently very
sketchy – from the physics of the glider to the physics of our universe.  Following this
path, we might try to produce set-theoretic constructions of particles in our universe.
13
References
Adamatzky, A. (1998) Universal dynamical computation in multidimensional excitable
lattices.  International Journal of Theoretical Physics 37 (12), 3069 - 3108.
Adamatzky, A. (Ed.) (2001) Collision-Based Computing.  London: Springer-Verlag.
Bedau, M. (1997) Weak emergence.  In J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives:
Mind, Causation, and World.  Vol. 11.   Malden, MA: Blackwell, 375-399.
Beer, R. (2004) Autopoesis and cognition in the game of life.  Artificial Life 10, 309-326.
Chen, L. V. (2006) Focus on Solition Research.  New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Dauxois, T. & Peyrard, M. (2006) Physics of Solitions.  New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Dennett, D. (1991) Real patterns.  The Journal of Philosophy 88 (1), 27-51.
Gardner, M. (1970).  The fantastic combinations of John Conway's new solitaire game
‘life’.  Scientific American  223 (October), 120–123.
Hovda, P. (2008) Quantifying weak emergence.  Minds and Machines 18, 461-473.
Lovejoy, A. (1936) The Great Chain of Being.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Meixner, U. (2010) Modelling Metaphysics: The Metaphysics of a Model.  Frankfurt:
Ontos Verlag.
Poundstone, W. (1985) The Recursive Universe: Cosmic Complexity and the Limits of
Scientific Knowledge.  Chicago: Contemporary Books Inc.
Quine, W. V. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.  New York: Columbia
University Press.
Rendell, P. (2001) Turing universality of the game of life.  In A. Adamatzky (Ed.)
(2001), 513 - 539.
Rennard, J.-P. (2001) Implementation of logical functions in the game of life. In A.
Adamatzky (Ed.) (2001),  491-512.
van Heijenoort, J. (Ed.) (1967) From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical
logic, 1879 – 1931.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
14
von Neumann, J. (1923) On the introduction of transfinite numbers.  In J. van Heijenoort
(Ed.) (1967), 346-354.
